







The ongoing debate on the impact of party government on welfare state reforms has led to contradictory findings due to different uses of data and methodology. This research presents a new combination of data and methods: fuzzy set methods applied to comparative entitlements data. It explores the different causal pathways that are connected to the level, trade-offs and change in entitlements in three welfare programmes by focussing on a number of causal conditions, in particular the left-right orientation of party government. The results show that the colour of party government matters in combination with other factors that affect their room to manoeuvre so that governments will lower, maintain or increase the levels of entitlements in accordance with their ideological preferences as long as the circumstances facilitate such a decision.
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Under which conditions does party government matter for welfare state reforms? This research question has received ample attention in the ‘Does Politics Matter’ literature (see for an overview: Keman 2002). Most of the time this research involved statistical (correlational) analysis on a small number of cases. These analyses include variables such as party preferences, cabinet composition, type of government, institutional arrangements and constraints. One problem with this type of small-n analysis is that the explained variance may be boosted by the low number of cases.
	Some recent advancements have been made by means of pooled time series analysis, but unfortunately this is accompanied by a number of problems and pitfalls. These are discussed by Kittel and Winner (2005) and Plümper, Troeger and Manow (2005) in their critique on the study of Garrett and Mitchell (2001) on the relationship between total government expenditure and the partisan composition of government as well as economic internationalization. Due to these complications some are in favour of qualitative in-depth analysis of government formations and the effects on policy-making (De Winter 2005). 
	One of the reoccurring conclusions in the ‘Does Politics Matter’ literature is that mixtures of institutions matter more than certain models of democracy with a prescribed set of institutions (e.g. Lane and Ersson 2002). In other words, which combinations of actors, contexts and institutions do lead to a certain outcome?​[1]​
Until now this type of research has mainly been done by means of correlations and regression, whereas other methods may be better equipped to deal with such a small-n design. This chapter demonstrates how configurational analysis, using Ragin’s Fuzzy set methodology, can highlight which combinations of causal factors affecting the room to manoeuvre of party government may impact on welfare entitlements (Ragin, 2008; Ragin and Pennings, 2005; Pennings, 2005). The research builds on a number of hypotheses that have been developed in previous research on the impact of party government on the type and degree of welfare state change (see: Keman, 2002; Allan and Scruggs, 2004).

How does party government matter for welfare state reforms?

The increasing pressures on welfare states raise the question how parties react to these pressures and which political and institutional factors account for differences in political responses (Däubler 2008; Starke 2006). For example, there is an ongoing debate on whether government partisanship still matters (Huber and Stephens, 2001; Pierson, 2001b; Allan and Scruggs, 2004) and on the degree to which powerful programme-specific groups of clients and specific interests have become veto-players that defend the status quo (Bonoli, 2000; Obinger et al., 2005; Pierson 1996: 147). Although welfare states seem to have been capable to resist radical welfare state reform, there are many empirical examples of changes (Vis and Van Kersbergen 2007). This paper focuses on the conditions in which the colour of party government plays a role in these changes. 
Castles (2002) has argued that partisan politics is not decisive for policy outcomes because social and economic factors are pivotal and the policy autonomy of political actors is limited (Castles 2002: 216). The focus of the research on how party government matters for welfare state reforms should be on the variation in policy outcomes and on the nature of the “causal sequences” determining outcomes. There are different “pathways” to similar public policy formation so that differences in interest group politics, partisan complexion of government and institutional arrangements do not translate into different policy outcomes because political actors (with opposing views) enjoy only limited autonomy (Castles 2002: 223). For this reason both left and right governments can be associated with both more and less retrenchment depending on the conditions in which they operate. 
Which these constraining conditions are is open to debate (Van Kersbergen and Manow 2008). Some argue that the most constraining factor is the logic of globalisation (which leaves little option but to reduce the size of the state). Others argue that the factor that most restricts the freedom of policy manoeuvre is the impact of prior policy choices. In addition there is the increasing impact of interest groups (labour and capital) that shapes policy outcomes due to the very success of the welfare state project in earlier post-war decades (Pierson 1996, 2001). As a consequence, causal complexity becomes the natural object of study. In the words of Castles, not the undifferentiated question, as whether politics matters, but how and to what extent aspects of democratic politics influence policy outcomes (Castles 2002: 232).
Lane and Ersson (2002) have made a similar argument from a different angle. They analysed the effects of democratic institutions on democratic performance. They contrast Westminster Democracy with Consensus Democracy and ask whether the main institutional characteristics of both ideal-types are necessary (all have to be present) or sufficient conditions (different combinations coincide with similar outcomes). They conclude that the latter is the case. For example, executive dominance can occur under a different set of combinations of conditions, such as a ‘pivot’ party like the DC (Italy), CDU (Germany), SAP (Sweden), DNA (Norway) and the CDA (the Netherlands) (Lane and Ersson 2002: 244). This diversity would urge for an atomistic position that treats each political institution (e.g. the electoral system) as a separate entity that may occur together with a large variety of other political institutions. This means that a multitude of combinations of institutions do exist and that each configuration is more or less different (Lane and Ersson 2002: 247). 
Van Kersbergen and Becker (2002) and Esping-Andersen (1990) have argued that a similar reasoning applies to the role of actors, in particular party families. Whereas the power resources argument (Korpi 1983, Shalev 1983) assumes that there is a linear relationship between working class power and the size of the welfare state, they argue that the role of social democracy is conditional. This means that, for example, social democracy is most likely to promote welfare statism if its power is matched by consensus-building mechanisms in both the polity and economy (Schmidt 1983; Van Kersbergen and Becker 2002: 193). Parties and unions alone have little effect on welfare statism. Only a configuration of strong Leftwing parties in government supported by an encompassing and centralized trade union movement will promote welfare statism (Van Kersbergen and Becker 2002: 193).
In a similar vein, Schmidt (2002) has argued that facilitating circumstances for radical policy change (either in support of the right or the left) are factors like high economic growth, political stability, stable majority status, divided opposition and a small number of veto players. Parties of the right are in the best position to retrench in case of a centralized unitary state and ideologically divided trade unions and opposition parties. Left parties in government have a strong position in case of a centralized unitary state combined with support from unions and quiescence of labour in order to make a difference (Schmidt 2002: 171; Cameron, 1984). Hence, partisan influence on public policy would be more pronounced in majoritarian democracies unless one or more components of the veto player theorem point into the other direction (i.e. ideological distance, duration of government, size of the change in power) (Schmidt 2002: 174; Tsebelis 1999).




Net replacement rates 
In a rights-based conception of welfare, retrenchment is understood as a reduction in the expected generosity of welfare benefits due to the withdrawal of social rights, not as a reduction of spending. Rights or entitlements are institutions (rules governing social insurance) that affect the incentive structure for every one covered. Levels of spending may be constant, whereas social rights do change. However, the use of net replacement rates as an alternative for social expenditures may also be problematic (Korpi, 2002). The development of net replacement rates is influenced by other factors than changes in social security schemes. These other factors include the tax system, but also development in average wages, which is not under government control. Further, changes in duration and eligibility criteria are not captured by net replacement rates. In principle these problems are recognised and (partly) solved in the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Data (CWED) dataset (Scruggs, 2002) by including additional variables and correcting for taxes. In this definition the net income replacement rate is the (after tax) portion of income in work that is replaced by social welfare benefits (Scruggs 2006: 352). These data are collected for each of the major social transfer programmes: unemployment insurance, sickness cash benefits (not health-care benefits) and public pensions.
	In the data analysis of Scruggs party government is treated as a partisanship variable that is either positively or negatively related to changes in replacement rates. He distinguishes between two areas of welfare statism: those of expansion (before the 1980s) and those of retrenchment (after the 1980s). Before the early 1980s leftist governments are associated with relatively high increases in replacement rates, whereas since the recessions of the early 1980s left governments are not significantly associated with increases in replacement rates.
In case of right governments the opposite pattern is found. Until the 1980s right governments are not associated with changes in replacements rates whereas after the 1980s this type of governments is associated with cuts in unemployment rates (p. 507). The estimated effects of partisanship on changes in sickness benefits are similar, namely that a shift to the right means a decrease in benefits.
We adopt Scruggs aggregate solution to the time lag problem: how a change in the colour of party government is related to a change in welfare state entitlements? Some have solved this problem by studying the effects of party government at the level of government (Huber and Stephens, 2001; Green Pedersen 2002). In that case the unit of analysis is each individual government and its motives (not to) change welfare entitlements. In this research the data are aggregated to the country level (for two time periods: affluence and austerity) because the national context is decisive for the decisions that governments make. Scruggs has shown that the level of entitlements is strongly related to the three welfare regimes distinguished by Esping-Andersen (1990). This means that what governments, having the same partisan composition, decide on welfare entitlements also depends on the regime type. For this reason we examine the effects of party government at the country level and not at the level of government. In addition, one should realise that the colour of party government is a structural feature of countries because there is not much change over time. 
The research of Scruggs indicates that governments are able to change entitlements within the time frame of one year. For this reason the first differences of the changes in three welfare entitlement  programmes are summed up for two time periods. By aggregating data to countries (per time period) the time lag problem is less pressing since we do not examine the changes in replacement rates at the level of governments.
This approach follows from the main question on the relationship between the colour of party government and welfare entitlements depending on the institutional context and economic tide. In addition, the problem we are interested in is more an independent variable problem: in which conditions does party government matter for the direction of welfare reforms (i.e. more or less entitlements) irrespective the extent to which these reforms are actually the result of the actions of individual governments. 
The main disadvantage of the use of replacement rates is that Central East European (CEE) countries had to be excluded. The collection of these data for CEE countries is not feasible for the two time periods under study because similar entitlements do not exist in most of the years. In order to include CEE countries one would have to shorten the time period and look fo alternative data, for example social expenditures. However, such an operationalisation of the dependent variable would suffer from the disadvantages that have been discussed extensively elsewhere (e.g. Esping-Anderson 1990). Hence, the decision to use the best available data on the crucial outcome variables comes at the cost of the exclusion of the CEE countries.

Fuzzy set methodology 
The fundamental logic of case-oriented comparative analysis rests on examining cases configurationally (see for an overview of the fuzzy-set method and its applications: Ragin and Pennings 2005; Pennings 2009; Ragin 2009; Rihoux and Ragin 2009). Rather than estimating the effect of one cause on the dependent variable holding the other independent variables constant, fs/QCA uses a causal system that allows for the interaction effects among each characteristic or attribute of a case. When K is the number of attributes, 2k configurations are possible. For example, instead of examining the independent effect of the presence of corporatism and the presence of social democratic government on the development of welfare states, fuzzy-set theory creates four causal configurative conditions and investigates their relationships with welfare state development, namely the presence or absence of corporatism in combination with the presence or absence of social democracy. The configurations are presented as equations applying “logical and (*)” in which a compound set of two or more sets are combined and “logical or (+)” in which the union of sets is represented by an addition sign in the equation. In this example the four possible combinations are: C*S + C*s + c*S + c*s where c and C refer to corporatism and s and S to social democracy (uppercase=present; lowercase=absent).
The fuzzy logic allows for degrees of membership. The researcher determines set membership by defining qualitative breakpoints of 1 (fully in) and 0 (fully out) with a scaling of membership scores between 0 and 1 to allow for partial membership. This procedure is called “calibration” and is based on substantive and theoretical knowledge relevant to set membership (Ragin 2008a). 




Conditions of Welfare State Reforms

In this research the crucial condition of Welfare State Reforms is the colour of party government (CPG). Its operationalisation deviates from the original CPG definition (Schmidt 1983) that intended to measure the combined strength of Left-Centre-Right in Government and Parliament. Since this is a nominal variable it cannot be directly transformed into a graded score. For this reason it is operationalised as the degree to which the left and right are represented in government by subtracting the percentage of right seats in government from the percentage of left seats in government. Although this measure differs from the original version, an analysis of variance shows a very strong association between the two versions, namely an Eta Squared of 0.83. In order to distinguish our measure from the original one, we will name it CPGLR. 
Allan and Scruggs expect that the dominance of right parties is favourable for decrease in benefit replacement rates (particularly in periods of retrenchment after 1980) and that left parties are favourable to an increase in replacement rates, especially during periods of welfare expansion (before 1980). This research builds on this assumption by means of an additional specification, namely that right parties will favour the increase of pension replacement rates at the cost of unemployment rates, particularly in periods of retrenchment and that left parties will favour the increase of unemployment replacement rates at the cost of pension rates. This also implies that an increase or decrease in replacement rates cannot be interpreted as welfare expansion or as retrenchment (as suggested by Scruggs, 2002). Welfare state change is not just a matter of trends of individual programmes, but of possible trade-offs between programmes that should be understood as political choices of party governments in favour of some group at the cost of another group.
While evaluating this trade-off between entitlements, we should take into account the micro/macro-paradox that limits rational parties in pursuing their interests because they must act within the rules of the political game in order to achieve their individual utility which yields optimal (not maximum) results (Keman 1999: 251). This means that the trade-off mechanism is not always and automatically present, but depends on how the rule of game is played given the conditions, constraints and the working of formal and informal institutions at a particular moment in time. The trade-off takes place in an interactive process between political institutions and rational actors (Keman 1999: 254).
One important institution is corporatism that may be defined as a system of tripartite interest-representation aiming at concerted political action to avert the consequences of economic crisis (Keman 1999: 261). For example, if a right government comes into office in a period in which there are strong unions and a corporatist intermediation structure it is much harder to cut unemployment replacement rates. A left government, on the other hand, will have problems in increasing unemployment replacement rates in case of weak unions in a non-corporatist environment. Hence, the feasibility of political choice depends on the institutional room to manoeuvre that may constrain actors in maximising their own needs (Keman 1999: 254). 
	We selected the most relevant causal factors from the research of Allan and Scruggs (2004). This number had to be reduced in order to balance the number of cases (18 countries) and the number of conditions. One group of factors involves economic indicators. One of them is GDP growth expecting that higher levels of growth will be associated with more generous benefits. Although they do not expect substantial globalization effects, the  impact of globalization is measured using two variables: trade openness ([imports +exports]/GDP) and financial openness, the latter being a composite measure of the restrictions placed on financial transactions by states. They also include controls for budget deficit (as a percentage of GDP) in order to control for the possibility that partisanship is correlated with budgetary crises, and the latter are correlated with changes in replacement rates. In order to control for a possible effect of the program population, the unemployment rate is included as an independent variable. In our analysis these conditions were not included in the fuzzy set models due to the small number of cases (n=18) but instead we calibrated the fuzzy set scores for two time periods in order to take these conditional factors into account.
In addition, Allan and Scruggs include two different types of political and welfare policy institutions. The first is Huber, Ragin, and Stephens’ (1997) measure of institutional veto points which indicates the extent to which governments may find their “room to manoeuver” restricted by general constitutional structures since more veto points are likely to be associated with less retrenchment. The second institutional variable is the extent to which corporatist bargaining arrangements dominate within a country. They employ Siaroff’s (1999) measure of “integration,” which provides a uni-dimensional and ordinal measure based on levels of social partnership, industry-level coordination and national policymaking patterns. Higher scores are indicative of greater neo-corporatism and less pluralism, and vary by decade. In line with previous empirical findings, they expect corporatist democracies to be more resistant to welfare state retrenchment.
Allan and Scruggs (2004) conclude that for unemployment benefits, estimates for both of the partisanship variables (left-cabinet shares and right-cabinet shares) are in the predicted direction. However, before the break points in the 1980s, left governments are associated with larger, statistically significant increases in replacement rates. In the era of welfare expansion, a government composed of all left parties increased replacement rates three points faster than a government of all right parties. However, since the recession of the early 1980s, left governments are not significantly associated with increases in replacement rates. For right governments, they find the mirror image of this effect. That is, up to the 1980s, right governments are associated with changes in replacement rates that cannot be differentiated from zero. Since the 1980s, in the era of welfare retrenchment, governments made up of all right-wing parties are associated with larger cuts (about 1.5 points larger) in unemployment replacement rates. According to Allan and Scruggs this result explains why previous studies, like Huber and Stephens, failed to find strong left-partisan effects during the 1980s and 1990s in their quantitative analyses. By estimating effects for the “pro welfare” parties (e.g. left), and not for the “anti welfare” ones, they exclude important partisan effects at work in retrenchment. The estimated effects of partisanship on changes in sickness benefits are very similar to those for unemployment. The coefficients suggest substantive effects of political shifts to the right that are in fact greater than those found for unemployment benefits. Overall then, these results suggest reasonably strong partisan effects on welfare state retrenchment, even with controls for the macroeconomic context and other common factors generally held to impact on the welfare state.
Allan and Scruggs (2004) fail to find widespread and robust effects of financial openness or trade openness on changes in benefits which is more or less consistent with previous work (Castles 2001; Pierson 2001). They only find reasonably consistent results for the restraining effects of openness on changes in sick pay in the 1970s and early 1980s. Regarding the institutional variables the results suggest that corporatist institutions may play a role in reducing welfare state retrenchment. Estimates for the variable corporatism are consistently positive (implying that more corporatist countries cut replacement rates less), and at least marginally statistically significant. Such results are consistent with the view that strong unions and policy concertation will tend to resist retrenchment or retrench less. In addition controlling for corporatist institutions suggests that taking them into account lowers the estimated retrenching effects of right governments, especially since the 1980s. However, the sign and significance of the corporatism estimates are sensitive to alternative specifications of the model, suggesting that they are not very robust. In contrast to the effects of corporatism, constitutional veto points seem to exert little discernible impact on welfare state outcomes (nor does it in alternative specifications).
Finally, the analysis of Allan and Scruggs (2004) provides at best limited evidence that macroeconomic constraints systematically facilitate the speed of retrenchment. Unemployment and higher budget deficits are both consistently associated with larger cuts in replacement rates in both programs. However, these effects are sensitive to the model specification and to the operationalisation of the dependent variable. 

Assessing the causal pathways

Our data result from an amalgamation of two data files, the Comparative Political Data Set I (CPDS) of Armingeon et al. (2008) that holds the data on the conditions and the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset (CWED) of Scruggs (2004) that includes data on the changes in entitlements. The data are aggregated into two time periods: before and after the structural break in welfare statism in the 1980s. Following Allan and Scruggs (2004: 505) for each country this break is coded 1 for years after the last negative (or the lowest) growth year in the first half of the 1980s.​[2]​ Hence the unit of analysis is the country level, distinguishing between the golden age and the age of retrenchment as two fundamentally different time periods. We expect that party governments of the same colour can make different decisions regarding entitlements in these two time periods. By aggregating the data to this level we surpass the “time lag problem” because we do not examine the causal complexity at the level of governments but at the aggregated level of countries. The analysis of Scruggs has clearly shown that the conditions under which governments decide to increase or decrease entitlements are regime specific. Hence the national context should be taken into account in order to understand under which conditions there is support for an increase or decrease of the entitlements.
The main outcome variables are the replacement rates for three welfare entitlement schemes: unemployment, pensions and sickness.​[3]​ The outcome variables are computed as first differences and as trade-offs (between pension replacement rates and unemployment replacement rates).
	The so-called “direct method” of fuzzy set calibration was used to calibrate the degree of membership in all sets (Ragin 2008b). This method is based on the researchers specification of the values of an interval scale that corresponds to the three qualitative breakpoints that structure a fuzzy set: the threshold for full membership (fuzzy score=0.95), the threshold for full nonmembership (fuzzy score=0.05) and the cross-over point (fuzzy score=0.50: maximum ambiguity). These benchmarks are used to transform the original values into fuzzy membership scores, using transformations based on the log odds of full membership (the procedure is integrated in the fsQCA software (Ragin 2008b) (Appendix B reports the used benchmarks). 
While interpreting the results one should be aware that fuzzy sets represent a calibration of the original raw scores in the CWED dataset. As a consequence, a rise in the fuzzy set scores between two time periods can coincide with a decrease of the absolute raw scores if this country is able to maintain a relatively high level compared to other countries. 
In general Allan and Scruggs (2004) conclude that welfare reforms are patterned by welfare state regime, that there is most retrenchment in the regime with the highest replacement scores and that there are significant within-regime differences in the degree of retrenchment. This conclusion is fundamentally different from most research based on social expenditures that mostly conclude that there is less change. It is also different from the fuzzy-sets approach that does not depart from raw scores, but from calibrated scores that are based on benchmarks for high, middle and low levels that differ per time period and per programme (see Appendix B). 
Not only the operationalisation but also the fuzzy set analysis of the conditions of welfare state change differs fundamentally from the statistical analysis of Allan and Scruggs. The fuzzy sets methodology focuses on the sixteen logically possible combinations of four conditions in relation to three different outcomes in two time periods (expansion and retrenchment):
-	the level of replacement rates for three entitlement programmes
-	the trade-off between unemployment and pension replacement rates
-	the degree of change in replacement rates for three entitlement programmes.
These three outcomes will be discussed in the order given above. All the findings are based on the so-called intermediate solutions which are minimal formula derived with the aid of only those logical remainders that are consistent with the researcher's theoretical and substantive knowledge (Ragin 2008a). The assumptions regarding the presence or absence of the causal conditions have been set to “present or absent” meaning that no assumptions have been made. As a consequence, there are more paths and they are a bit more complex compared to the situation in which certain assumptions would have been made.
The first part of the analysis focuses the causal paths or trajectories to relatively high levels of replacement rates for three entitlement programmes in 18 countries in two time periods: before and after the break in welfare expansion (the beginning of the 1980s). We start with the levels. 
In case of unemployment the path with the highest unique coverage (0.19) in both time periods is OPENC*INTEGR*CPGLR meaning that the combination of openness and corporatism and left governments often coincides with high levels of unemployment replacement rates. CPGLR matters since all paths where CPGLR is absent (which means that right governments prevail) the unique coverage is low. Hence, CPGLR plays a role in explaining the level of unemployment replacement rates, but only in combination with corporatism and openness. The number of veto players and the degree of unemployment are not important conditions.
In case of the level of pension rates there are two trajectories in the period of affluence each including four conditions of which three are present in both paths:
ELDERLY*CPGLR*VETOPLAYER. The strongest path is the one in which INTEGR is also present (coverage=0.25, consistency=0.85). After the break CPGLR is only part of the weakest path (coverage=0.09). The combination ELDERLY*OPENC*INTEGR (coverage=0.48; consistency=0.85) is clearly the strongest which is similar to the trajectories found in case of the unemployment replacement rates.
In case of sickness replacement rates in the period of affluence there are five trajectories of which the two strongest include both CPGLR (left) and cpglr (right). The paths are rather weak (coverage between 0.03 and 0.14). After the break CPGLR is only part of the two strongest (but still weak) paths (coverage 0.10, consistency 0.97). The causal complexity is rather high, probably due to the fact that the conservative and social democratic regimes maintain similar levels of sickness replacement rates.
These trajectories do not have the same relevance for all countries. Especially the countries that deviate from the general pattern are interesting because they may highlight factors or conditions that are not included on the model. In case of unemployment entitlements especially Belgium, Austria and Italy do fit less well in the general pattern as these countries seem to have lower levels of unemployment entitlements than one would expect given the prevalent conditions in these countries. All three are corporatist countries with traditionally a strong Christian democracy. In case of the level of pensions, Norway, Denmark and Switzerland fit less well and in case of sickness Australia, Japan and Austria have a weaker fit. These countries seem to have lower levels of replacement rates than one would expect given the prevailing conditions in these countries.
Notwithstanding these deviations, the levels of replacement rates in three welfare programmes seem to be strongly linked to the structural features of economies, especially openness and corporatism which are often part of the trajectories. Although CPGLR plays a role since it is present in the strongest path in both time periods, it does not seem to be a necessary condition as it is only relevant in combination with other factors. This confirms the finding of Allen and Scruggs (2004) that the level of welfare entitlements is a feature of the type of welfare state. The results also indicate that the three welfare entitlement programmes are quite different in the sense that different causal pathways apply and the countries that do not fit are also different for each model. This does not indicate that each model is in need of different additional conditions in order to yield better explanations, since country-specific combinations of factors may be the cause of higher or lower levels than expected.
We now turn to the change in entitlements, in particular to the conditions related to a positive trade-off of unemployment replacement rates at the cost of pension replacement rates or the other way around. This is calculated as the number of times that a rise in unemployment replacement rates coincides (in the same year) with a decrease in pension rates. It is expected that left governments will be inclined to this type of trade-off whereas right government will be more inclined to do the opposite by favouring pensioners at the expense of the unemployed.
The analysis shows that trade-off of unemployment replacement rates at the cost of pension replacement rates in periods of affluence only takes place in the combination OPENC*INTEGR*CPGLR (coverage=0.23, consistency=0.84), that is if left governments in conjunction with corporatism and open economy. Right governments can also be associated with this type of trade-off if there is a combination of unemployment, weak corporatism and few veto players (coverage=0.21, consistency=0.84). In case of periods of deterioration only CPGLR (and not cpglr) is part of two of the trajectories. CPGLR is not part of the strongest trajectory which is OPENC*INTEGR*VETOPLAYER (coverage=0.18, consistency=0.90).
In case of a trade-off in which pension replacement rates rise at the cost of unemployment replacement rates the presence of rightist government is indeed a causal condition which is part of several weak paths before the break and part of the strongest path after the break. When we assume that all conditions are present, except the veto players and CPGLR, ELDERLY is the strongest path before the break (coverage=0.44, consistency=0.92). After the break the absence of CPGLR (or: rightist governments) is part of the strongest path (together with vetoplayer*ELDERLY*OPENC) (coverage=0.31, consistency=0.87). 
This analysis shows that although there is no one-to-one relationship between CPGLR and trade-offs between entitlements as the pathways reveal some interesting patterned variations. In several cases the conditions represent obstacles or vehicles for change and different combinations can hamper or facilitate a shift in entitlements. In periods of economic deterioration different combinations of factors lead to the same outcome. Trade-offs in favour of pensions are mainly present in case of right governments (especially in the period of retrenchment) but in only combination with facilitating factors such as a low number of veto players. Al in all, these findings suggest that CPGLR is more relevant for explaining change than for explaining level because changes in entitlements are more directly based on decisions made by governments. Especially the trade-off between employment and pension rates is a political choice for which the colour of party government turns out to be relevant, but only under certain facilitating conditions.
In sum, the colour of party government is conditionally related to the trade-off between unemployment replacement rates and pension replacement rates. In periods of affluence both right and left governments may be part of causal pathways that lead to a trade-off that benefits the unemployed. But in periods of deterioration only CPGLR is part of such trajectories. In periods of deterioration both right and left governments may be part of pathways that lead to a trade-off that benefits pensioners. But in periods of deterioration mainly cpglr (right governments) is part of such trajectories. The colour of party government especially makes a difference in periods of deterioration. The results make less clear what the role of veto players is, just as in the research of Allan and Scruggs (2004).
	Finally, the configurations of conditions leading to change in replacement rates are examined. Change is operationalised as the sum of the first differences which are aggregated per time period. Since we are interested in the change in the period after 1980 compared to the level of the period before the 1980s, the degree of change is only presented for one time period (namely after the beginning of the 1980s). One new condition is added, namely the level of entitlements in the period before the 1980s. It is expected that there is an increase in entitlements if the level of entitlements before the 1980s is low. In a similar vein, it is expected that there is a decrease in entitlements if the level of entitlements before the 1980s is relatively high.
The research of Scruggs (2006) has shown that the level of replacement rates is strongly related to the types of welfare state regimes as distinguished by Esping-Andersen (1990). One of the puzzles to be solved is in which type of regime there is more likely a rise or fall in replacements rates in the era of retrenchment. Whereas Huber and Stephens (2001) and Swank (2002) find that large welfare states are able to maintain their levels of welfare (compared to lean states), Scruggs and others do conclude the opposite (Pennings 2005). Our fuzzy set analysis includes a condition that indicates the level of replacement rates in the period of welfare expansion (before the 1980s). This condition turns out to be not necessary, but it is part of all causal trajectories, except the one related to sickness. 
In case of unemployment replacement rates the intermediate solution shows that low levels before the 1980s are part of two trajectories (coverage=0.18 and 0.22, consistency=0.91). The other factors in both paths can be either present or absent, and hence do not matter, except unemployment. In case of pension replacement rates we find one single path that combines low levels of pension entitlements before the 1980s with weak corporatism, weak veto players, rightist governments and a large number of elderly (coverage=0.26, consistency=0.84). In other words, change is the result of the interaction between actors (governments), institutions and the national context and the size of the problem (i.e. the number of elderly). This means that an increase of these entitlements only takes place in very specific conditions that clarify the role of party government. The results show that right governments are inclined to increase pension entitlements if there is the need to do so and if there are not too many counter pressures. In case of changes in sickness replacement the path is nearly similar as the second trajectory related to unemployment: VETOPLAYER*UNEMPL*CPGLR*integr (coverage=0.34, consistency=0.98). This time low levels of sickness replacement rates in the 1980s are not among the conditions.




This research departs from the research question in which conditions the colour of party government matters for the level, change and trade-offs between entitlement programmes (unemployment, pensions and sickness)? The results show that the levels correspond with the three types of welfare regimes as distinguished by Esping-Andersen (1990). These levels are high in the Social Democratic, intermediate in Continental and low in Anglo-Saxon welfare states. As a consequence, the impact of the colour of party government on welfare entitlements is influenced by the institutional context. This implies that CPGLR does not have an  autonomous effect on its own since it cannot by itself generate more or less retrenchment of replacement rates.
	The different trajectories show that CPGLR matters for trade-off and for change, but less for the level since the level is a structural feature of welfare regimes that cannot be changed overnight (by one or several governments). This structural feature can be recognised in the fuzzy set models by the frequent occurrence of INTEGR*OPENC: open economies with corporatist interest mediation structures often also have relatively high levels of replacement rates.
CPGLR is more important for the trade-off between unemployment and pension replacement rates especially in the period after the beginning of the 1980s when the economic deterioration puts more pressure on governments to make hard choices. The colour of party government matters in combination with supportive conditions that facilitate or hamper trade-off. The left is more likely to favour the unemployed at the cost of pensioners and the right to do it the other way around, but whether this actually occurs depends on the institutional context and the economic conditions. In general the left and right will pursue goals according to their ideology if the supportive conditions facilitate this.
The degree of change illustrates the previous point. In case of unemployment both left and right governments can play a role in an increase in replacement rates. If there has been a low level of unemployment replacement rates before the 1980s and there are many unemployed after that period, then both left and right governments might be part of trajectories that lead to higher replacement rates. The presence of right governments leads only to an increase of pension entitlements under specific conditions: relatively low levels before the 1980s, weak corporatism, many veto players and many elderly.
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Appendix A. Operationalisation and sources of the raw scores.
variable	Description	Operationalisation of the raw scores	source
break	Break between the golden age (0) and the period of rolling back (1)	See note one	Scruggs 2004
ue 	Unemployment Insurance Replacement Rate	mean of Unemployment Insurance Single Person Replacement Rates and Unemployment Insurance Family Replacement Rates	Scruggs 2004
pension 	Pension Replacement Rate	mean of Standard Pension Single Person Replacement Rate and Standard Pension Couple Replacement Rate	Scruggs 2004
sick 	Sickness Insurance Replacement Rates	Mean of Sickness Insurance Single Person Replacement Rates and Sickness Insurance Family Replacement Rates	Scruggs 2004
tradeoffue 	trade-off between unemployment replacement rates and pension replacement rates	The number of years in which the change in unemployment replacement rates is positive and the change in pension replacement rates in negative	Scruggs 2004
tradeoffp 	trade-off between pension replacement rates and unemployment replacement rates	The number of years in which the change in pension replacement rates is positive and the change in unemployment replacement rates in negative	Scruggs 2004
uediff 	Change in Unemployment Insurance Replacement Rates	Sum of the first differences in Unemployment Insurance Replacement Rates	Scruggs 2004
pendiff 	Change in Pension Insurance Replacement Rates	Sum of the first differences in Pension Insurance Replacement Rates	Scruggs 2004
sickdiff 	Change in Sickness Insurance Replacement Rates	Sum of the first differences in Sickness Insurance Replacement Rates	Scruggs 2004
cpglr	The colour of party government	The percentage of left seats in government minus the percentage of right seats in government	Armingeon et al. 2008
Vetoplayer 	The number of Veto players	Based on 10 dummy variables: 1. consociational democracy, 2. federalism, 3. central bank autonomy, 4. Lijphart index of judicial review, 5. EU membership, 6. developed protection of minorities, 7. bicameralism, 8. coalition government, 9. self-administration in social policy, 10. developed direct democracy	Schmidt 2002
integr 	corporatism	Integrated economy. Siaroff Index (1999). ‘5’ indicating greatest integration, ‘1’ least integrated economies. The Siaroff Index can be considered as a proxy for corporatism.	Armingeon et al. 2008
openc 	Openness of the economy	Openness of the economy in current prices, measured as total trade (sum of import and export) as a percentage of GDP.	Armingeon et al. 2008
unempl 	Unemployment rate 	Unemployment rate as a percentage of civilian labour force.	Armingeon et al. 2008













Austria0    	0	0.42	0.9	0.85	0.5	0.88	0.41	0.01	0.07	0.97	1	0.99	0.7	0.05	0.98
Belgium0    	0	0.57	0.95	0.86	0.95	0.5	0.41	0.24	0.76	0.67	0.67	0.96	0.97	0.81	0.95
Canada0     	0	0.7	0.15	0.67	0.95	0.95	0.79	0.38	0	0.41	0.17	0.02	0.44	0.96	0.03
Denmark0    	0	0.95	0.19	0.8	0.5	0.95	0	0.02	0.53	0.89	0.17	0.98	0.69	0.77	0.93
Finland0    	0	0.22	0.2	0.66	0.95	0.98	0.04	0.71	0.58	0.79	0.33	0.98	0.57	0.55	0.51
France0     	0	0.24	0.36	0.49	0.05	0.95	0.78	0.78	0.07	0.11	0.67	0.04	0.17	0.72	0.92
Germany0    	0	0.8	0.85	0.97	1	0.95	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.86	0.87	0.97	0.17	0.22	0.97
Ireland0    	0	0.44	0.05	0.46	0.5	0.73	0.81	0.69	0.81	0.08	0.33	0.1	0.92	0.99	0.42
Italy0      	0	0.01	0.61	0.78	0.5	0.95	0	0.04	0.04	0.65	0.67	0.08	0.25	0.95	0.76
Japan0      	0	0.74	0.07	0.31	0.05	0.95	0.03	0.97	0.09	0	0.5	0.78	0.02	0.04	0.02
Netherlands0	0	0.99	0.27	0.92	0.05	0.95	0.02	0.55	0.02	0.47	0.67	0.93	0.95	0.77	0.48
New Zealand0	0	0.21	0.06	0.27	0.05	0.05	0.33	0.51	0.33	0.18	0.17		0.51	0	0.03
Norway0     	0	0.64	0.21	0.88	0.95	0.95	0.52	0.52	0.95	0.92	0	0.99	0.84	0.03	0.95
Sweden0     	0	0.96	0.49	0.93	0.95	0.95	0.12	0.54	0.5	0.71	0	0.99	0.58	0.07	0.99
Switzerland0	0	0.58	0.09	0.87	0.95	0.5	0.97	0.71	0.06	0.3	0.87	0.97	0.68	0	0.91
UK0         	0	0.48	0.04	0.49	0.95	0.98	0	0.62	0	0.41	0	0.06	0.53	0.6	0.96










Austria1    	1	0.67	0.94	0.88	0.5	0.68	0.24	0.26	0.54	0.82	1	0.99	0.75	0.15	0.95
Belgium1    	1	0.65	0.95	0.92	0.98	0.05	0.24	0.03	0.46	0.65	0.67	0.91	0.98	0.97	0.97
Canada1     	1	0.76	0.57	0.66	0.73	0.05	0.58	0.62	0.79	0.09	0.17	0.02	0.65	0.92	0.02
Denmark1    	1	0.8	0.43	0.69	0.01	0.82	0.01	0.48	0.08	0.25	0.17	0.96	0.73	0.74	0.96
Finland1    	1	0.69	0.65	0.88	0.5	0.5	0.8	0.43	0.1	0.49	0.33	0.98	0.6	0.92	0.64
France1     	1	0.75	0.58	0.58	0.98	0.5	0.67	0.04	0.62	0.86	0.67	0.08	0.39	0.97	0.89
Germany1    	1	0.71	0.8	0.96	0.95	0.68	0.27	0.05	0.25	0.55	0.87	0.97	0.52	0.76	0.99
Ireland1    	1	0.25	0.16	0.31	0.18	0.12	0.01	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.33	0.15	0.97	0.99	0.01
Italy1      	1	0.04	0.95	0.84	0.88	0.5	0.97	0.97	0.86	0.7	0.67	0.27	0.35	0.98	0.98
Japan1      	1	0.45	0.6	0.4	0.95	0.05	0.19	0.24	0.97	0.01	0.5	0.85	0.02	0.11	0.62
Netherlands1	1	0.94	0.31	0.83	0.88	0.27	0.05	0.14	0.18	0.47	0.67	0.95	0.94	0.7	0.23
New Zealand1	1	0.23	0.22	0.32	0.88	0.5	0.15	0.45	0.3	0.25	0.17	0.1	0.59	0.5	0.01
Norway1     	1	0.81	0.56	0.97	0.5	0.98	0.3	0.56	0.5	0.84	0	0.99	0.72	0.19	0.99
Sweden1     	1	0.96	0.77	0.91	0.88	0.05	0.17	0.05	0.17	0.96	0	0.99	0.69	0.39	1
Switzerland1	1	0.93	0.13	0.86	0.95	0.12	0.54	0.35	0.39	0.33	0.87	0.97	0.72	0.05	0.96
UK1         	1	0.06	0.25	0.09	0.05	0.95	0.01	0.73	0.02	0.09	0	0.04	0.54	0.87	0.98
USA1        	1	0.5	0.74		0.05	0.68	0.04	0.26		0.05	0.5	0.05	0.03	0.5	0.09




















^1	  The word ‘outcome’ in this chapter refers to the phenomenon to be explained, and not to macroeconomic policy outcomes, unless it is explicitly stated that way.
^2	  Individual break points are: 1978: New Zealand; 1981: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Sweden and the UK; 1982: Canada, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland and the USA; 1983: Australia, France, Ireland and Japan.
^3	  Following the methodology discussed in Esping-Andersen (1990), Allan and Scruggs (2004) estimated the benefits due for the first six months of the event and then annualized this figure in order to calculate a notional “tax owed” for the individual. They deducted any income taxes or social charges due on that benefit and divided that figure by the net wage of the “average production worker” (APW). For benefits, they drew upon information from national government agencies responsible for such programs. Wage and tax structure information are derived from the OECD’s Tax/Benefit Position and Taxing Wages publications with additional information from various national governments. The net replacement rates for sickness and unemployment are calculated for two recipient groups: (a) a single worker, and (b) a married APW with a non employed spouse and two children. The replacement rates are the average for the two household types. An example of how the net replacement rate is calculated is given by Allan and Scruggs, 2004: 511.
